The Nuts and Bolts of Deploying Process-Level IDS in Industrial Control Systems

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Industrial Control Systems



Industrial Control Systems (ICS)

- control industrial processes;
- typically operate on critical infrastructures.

Cyber-Attacks on ICS



The Problem

- Attacks on ICS are increasing.
- Successful attacks on ICS
 - can be highly rewarding for attackers;
 - may have far-reaching consequences on society at large.
- Classical IT-based security is not sufficient.

Process-Level Attack Detection




Process-Level Attack Detection

Why? Because ICS combine both IT and OT technologies.


What? Check if physical process deviates from the norm.

How? By monitoring **process output** in real time.



















ICS behavior is deterministic



ICS-Specific Features

- Controllers (e.g., PLCs) operate in a cyclic manner.
- Signals repeat ⇒ level of determinism is relatively high.
- Normal behavior can be learned or modeled.

ICS behavior is deterministic



ICS-Specific Features

Controllers (e.g., PLCs) operate in a cyclic manner.

Regularity of ICS behavior enables data-driven approaches.

Normal behavior can be learned or modeled.

Data-Driven Methods



Classical Approach

Build a model of the physical process

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Use the model to **predict** future system behavior

Monitor residuals: Is **observed** — **predicted** too large?

Urbina, David I., et al. "Limiting the Impact of Stealthy Attacks on Industrial Control Systems." 2016 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.

Data-Driven Methods



Classical Approach

Build a model of the physical process

Use the model to predict future system behavior Solving a more general problem as an intermediate step!

Monitor residuals: Is **observed** – **predicted** too large?

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PASAD

- solves an easier problem;
- requires limited knowledge of system dynamics;
- 3 is capable of detecting subtle changes in system behavior.



PASAD

1 solves an easier problem:

Learns normal behavior from historical data



Measures to what extent **present** readings **conform** with the estimated dynamics.



PASAD

1 solves an easier problem:

Learns normal behavior from historical data

No need to predict the future!

Measures to what extent **present** readings **conform** with the estimated dynamics.



PASAD

- requires limited knowledge of system dynamics:
 - It is entirely data-driven.
 - Uses only raw sensor readings.
 - It is model-free.




PASAD

2 requires limited knowledge of system dynamics:

- It is entirely PASAD is specification-agnostic.
- Uses only ray Applicable to various systems.
- It is model-free.




PASAD






PASAD






PASAD





PASAD





Rationale: Detect attacks on ICS by monitoring sensor measurements for unusual behavior.

PASAD works in two phases: Offline learning and online detection.



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PASAD works in two phases: Offline learning and online detection. **Learning Phase:** Create a mathematical representation of the norm

- Extract noise-reduced signal information from noisy time series of sensor readings.
- Construct Signal Subspace and project training vectors.
- Compute centroid of the cluster formed by training vectors.



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
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
Detection Phase: Track distance from the centroid

- Project most recent measurement vector onto the subspace.
- Compute a departure score: distance from the centroid.
- Raise an alarm if a certain threshold is crossed.






























































































































Validation — Evaluation on Various Systems







Deploying a Prototype in a Real Environment



Deployment in a real control system

- A full-fledged PASAD prototype was deployed in a paper factory in Sweden.
- System operation was monitored for 75 days.

Challenges



Challenges include

- dealing with an unknown environment;
- achieving high performance and low footprint;
- maintaining system stability;
- trust and data access issues.



Overview

- Bro for network parsing
- Parsing of Modbus data

- Buffer for event synchronization
- PASAD for analysis




Figure: System overview



Network Capturing Subsystem

Handling Modbus Traffic with Bro

- There exist several variants of the Modbus protocol.
- The communication is Client-Server based.
- Nodes are identified using UID and IP addresses.
- Transaction ID (TID) is needed to match requests and responses.



Network Capturing Subsystem




Figure: The Bro framework.



Buffering Subsystem

- Synchronizes Bro events with PASAD.
- Receives Bro events via a socket (broccoli library).
- Stores values in a bounded buffer.
- Provides interface to PASAD.



The key to success: a local testbed

- Used real Modbus/TCP traffic from water distribution plant.
- Captured traffic was replayed over a small network.
- Stress testing the prototype.
- Emulating packet drops.
- Identifying unexpected behaviours.





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


Figure: Production line.





Figure: (1) The control frame with sensors.





Figure: (2) The actuators for the water valves.





Figure: (3) The drying process.





Figure: (4) The paper roll.



Deployment

- Raspberry Pi 3+
- Gigabit Ethernet
- 1.4 GHz quad-core processor
- 1 GB RAM
- Rasbian OS



Results



Process Monitoring




Figure: Sensor readings and departure score from PASAD.

Results



System Load




Figure: Processor and memory usage.

Conclusions



Lessons Learned

- Process agnostic does not mean plug-and-play.
- Signal data interruptions are tolerable.
- Bro was easy and versatile for Modbus parsing.
- Buffering is valuable, especially with Bro.